

NOV 12 1950

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ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH

Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP75-00149R000100920007-6

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Intelligence Reports Tailored To Fit U.S. Policy, Admiral Says

He Testifies Before Senate Group There Was 'Confused Distortion and Appraisal' of Facts;

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WASHINGTON, Nov. 12—A

retired admiral has become convinced through personal experience that United States intelligence reports are tailored sometimes to fit policy, rather than citing facts, testimony released yesterday disclosed.

This conclusion was reached by Adm. Charles Maynard Cooke, who was chief of staff to Fleet Adm. Ernest King, the latter part of World War II. He revealed it in testimony at a staff conference of the Senate internal security subcommittee last month. Adm. Cooke recommended that a high-level civilian advisory group on intelligence be created to evaluate the information on which American policy is based. He also suggested that a joint congressional committee be established to concern itself with the problem.

Senator James O. Eastland (Dem.), Mississippi, chairman of the investigating panel, ordered release of Adm. Cooke's testimony yesterday in the light of "recent apparent failure of intelligence officers to inform the United States Government of developments in the Middle East.

Similar Testimony.

Robert Morris, chief counsel of the panel, noted meanwhile that Angus Ward, who retired in August after spending 31 years as a career diplomat, largely in Asia, had recently given similar testimony.

Ward had testified that he

was discouraged by his superiors from telling policy makers of his experiences with Red Chinese and, at least in one instance, "deception" was used to prevent him from giving his information to the Defense Department.

In his testimony, taken at Sonoma, Calif., last Oct. 7, Adm. Cooke dealt with events in 1949 when the future of Formosa was a top crucial issue.

He testified that Robert Strong, consul general at Taipei, reported that Formosa would fall within a week or so.

"There seemed to be," the admiral said, "a confused distortion and appraisal of certain strategic aspects of the general situation."

Morris asked whether the admiral had found, on a trip to Formosa, a situation that coincided with the reports sent to the United States by Strong.

Not Supported by Facts.

"No," said the admiral. "they did not. Also I found in Formosa that a number of people were familiar with the reports that had been made. I did not find anything in Formosa which supported the reports made in October and November of 1949, setting forth, as they did, the imminence of the fall of Formosa to Communism within a period of two or three weeks."

"I also was informed that one of the assistant military attaches, Capt. J. R. Manning, had wished to report facts which did not fit in with the character of reports apparently desired by the State Depart-

ment representation, and who therefore made a direct report to the War Department. Further, I was informed that Capt. Manning had been summarily detached from his duty as assistant military attaché and sent to the United States command in Tokyo."

The transcript continued: "Mr. Morris: That would appear, would it not, admiral, to be an example of policy shaping intelligence reports, rather than

policy following facts revealed by intelligence?

"Admiral Cooke: I would rather put it this way: As it appeared to me, there was a policy that had been set up in Washington by the United States Government and which was being followed by the State

Department representatives in Formosa, which required that intelligence facts should conform to the policy rather than have a change of policy that would be guided by the facts."

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